You are currently browsing the tag archive for the ‘Tamil Nadu’ tag.

Bashful 2I had written about good ambassadors being dismissed well before Dayan having to come back to Sri Lanka to deal with audit queries, though in fact he survived because the President intervened and called a halt to the persecution. Asitha was not so lucky, and Chris Nonis in London told me that he had to put up with constant complaints, even though he was a good communicator and managed to deal with at least some of the propaganda against us, of which England was the main source. But Chris too had his problems, for as he was appointed he had displayed deep animosity to his excellent Deputy, Pakeer Amza, who had had to act as High Commissioner for a long period – given the absurd neglect of this vital position by the Ministry, at a time when Britain got a new government. It is likely that Chris was warned against Amza, who had stood up against Kshenuka and Sajin over the disastrous 2010 visit of the President to Britain.

But the suspicions that had been sowed had a permanent effect. Amza was swiftly transferred, as Deputy to Berlin, which was not commensurate with his abilities, though he was relieved to find a positive ambassador in the person of Sarath Kongahage, himself not a career diplomat. Along with Amza went the Political Officer, a Tamil officer of considerable capacity. So, at a time when relations with the diaspora were of the essence, the London office was without a senior official who was, or even spoke, Tamil. Chris meanwhile had been sent a very capable Ministry official called Lenagala, but he soon fell out with him, and asked for a non-career replacement. He was sent Neville de Silva, who had previously served in Bangkok, a journalist and the brother of the more famous journalist Mervyn de Silva, who was Dayan Jayatilleka’s father. But by then the suspicions Chris had developed were entrenched, and soon Neville too found himself sidelined and soon enough removed.

There was confusion elsewhere too, as has been noted for instance with regard to Canada, another post where good diplomacy was essential, given the influence of the diaspora and what seemed unremitting hostility from the Canadian government. In India there were constant changes to our representative in Chennai, and the Tamil diplomat who had been well thought of was suddenly dismissed. He had got me over in 2012 to talk to academics and journalists, and I gathered then that I was the first such visitor he had had, because the Foreign Ministry treated Tamilnadu with contempt and was then surprised when it expressed vehement criticism which Delhi then had perforce to take up.

But the Foreign Ministry was not the only place where Sajin’s destructive influence reigned. He had also been appointed as Secretary to the Committee to negotiate with the Tamil National Alliance, but he saw himself as a full member of the team, and was treated as such by GL. It should be noted though that GL had no strong principles about this, and he astonished me soon after I joined the team by bringing a young student who was the son of a former student of his (and who happened to be related to me) who he said was interested in politics, and asking if he could sit in on the discussions. The TNA did not object, but I could well understand why they found it difficult to take the negotiations seriously. Read the rest of this entry »

Advertisements

Moving forward India SLText of a presentation by Prof Rajiva Wijesinha

At the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata

At an international seminar held on November 6th and 7th 2014 on

An Appraisal of India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Way Forward

 

In the period leading up to the victory over the terrorist Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009, India and Sri Lanka enjoyed an excellent relationship. It was clear that, despite the opposition of politicians in Tamilnadu, India was supportive of the military initiatives of the Sri Lankan government. More importantly, it assisted Sri Lanka in dealing effectively with the efforts of some Western countries to stop the Sri Lankan offensive, and then to condemn it after the military success of May 2009. This was most obvious in Geneva, where the Indian Permanent Representative, together with his Pakistani counterpart, comprised the negotiating team that accompanied the Sri Lankan Permanent Representative, Dr Dayan Jayatilleka, into discussions with Western nations that had wanted a resolution critical of Sri Lanka.

Since then the relationship deteriorated. In 2012 India voted in favour of a resolution put forward by the United States that was strongly critical of the Sri Lankan government. And though much aid and assistance was given to Sri Lanka for reconstruction after the war, India seems to feel that this is not properly appreciated – as evinced by recent remarks by the Indian High Commissioner.

Conversely, a response to his speech in a Sri Lankan newspaper displays even great angst, culminating in the complaint that ‘In the more recent past, India repeatedly voted against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in Geneva whereas in view of India’s domestic political constraints, all India had to do was abstain which Sri Lanka would have appreciated immensely.’ Before that there had been a catalogue of the support offered in the eighties by India to terrorist movements in Sri Lanka.

That support is a fact, and India must recognize not only the damage done to Sri Lanka by its support for terrorists in the eighties, but also the continuing exploitation of that support by forces in Sri Lanka that I would describe as racist. But Sri Lanka too must recognize that those actions were committed thirty years ago, and also that there were reasons for India to behave as it did. Though I think it is important to affirm the moral principle that assistance to terrorists is totally beyond the pale, we have to understand that India felt threatened at the time by the hostility evinced by the United States during the Cold War period.

When the government of President J R Jayewardene abandoned Sri Lanka’s traditional policies of Non-Alignment and close understanding with India, to the extent of offering facilities in Sri Lanka to a country that made no secret that India was the principal target of its military adventurism in the Indian Ocean, India reacted aggressively. As your current Deputy National Security Adviser, Mr Gupta, put it succinctly, though such a response was not justifiable, it was understandable.

This was in the context of an attempt by one of his subordinates at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis to defend Indian support for terrorists. I appreciated Mr Gupta’s forthrightness at the time, and I believe this should be shared by Indian analysts of the current relationship. At the same time it is even more important that Sri Lankan analysts, such as they are because we do not have a tradition of intellectual rigidity, recognize the seminal damage done to the relationship by the adventurism of the then Sri Lankan government.

The current Sri Lankan government must also recognize that today, thirty years later, India might be worried by what seems total commitment to China. I do not think this is what China wants, and I do not think any serious thinker in Sri Lanka would argue that the relationship with China must be developed with no regard for Indian sensitivities. But sadly Sri Lanka currently has no coherent foreign policy, and the practices and pronouncements of many of those in positions of influence create the impression that we are putting all our eggs into the China basket. This impression is fuelled by the United States, ironically so, given that in the eighties it saw China as a tool to be used against its great enemy at the time, the Soviet Union, with which India was closely allied. Read the rest of this entry »

Interview with Ceylon Today

Q: India abstained from voting at the UN Human Rights resolution on Sri Lanka in Geneva,last week. Given that India had voted for the previous resolution in 2013, do you see a major shift in the Indian stance on the matters related to the international scrutiny on the Sri Lankan government over its human rights record?

No, I think India has been absolutely consistent. Like our cabinet, which endorsed the LLRC Action Plan, it believes we need to do much to promote reconciliation, but it believes we must do this ourselves. This time, unlike in previous years, the US and its allies included external intrusion, which goes against the principles of the UN. India, given its leading role in promoting a multi-polar world rather than domination by one ethos, could not support such a dramatic departure from international norms.

Q: In your opinion, what did prompt India to abstain from voting?

Recognition that this sort of intrusion could set unfortunate precedents for all countries that do not play ball with  the West.

Q:  India’s permanent representative at  Geneva cited the ‘intrusive nature’ of the UN resolution as the reason for their decision to abstain. But, were there geopolitical concerns such as countering Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, that could have underpinned the Indian decision?

Had that been the main reason, India might as well have played along with the West, which seems keen on going back to the absolute divisions of Cold War days. Though China has been a solid friend to Sri Lanka, given geographical and economic realities, India throwing its weight behind the West would have left us helpless – and indeed China has pointed this out in urging us always to maintain good relations with India.

Q: India’s decision to abstain would give it a greater leverage on the matters concerning justice and accountability in Sri Lanka as well political aspirations of Tamils.  Do you agree?

It should make us realize that we need to work together with India, just as we did during the conflict. India like us was committed to eradicating terrorism, and like the President it saw this as essential for the benefit of all Sri Lankans including the Tamils. But I fear the dwarfs who dominate policy making will continue to sow distrust. Recently for instance there were attempts to convince the President that the Indian government was behind the Tamil Nadu state’s attempt to pardon Rajiv Gandhi’s killers. I cannot understand how that could be believed, and fortunately Delhi acted immediately so the President would have seen the true picture.  

Q: The incumbent government has repeatedly failed to honor the undertakings given to New Delhi in terms of implementing a political solution in line with the 13  amendment Plus. So you expect that the government of Sri Lanka would now be compelled to work on a political solution, at least as a gesture of goodwill towards New Delhi?

We should be working on a political solution for the sake of our own people. But clear instructions give by the President are ignored so the impression has been created that he  cannot be trusted. This is a tragic situation, given what I believe is his essentially pluralistic vision, but he must now work seriously on implementing the manifesto on which he won  election, instead of seeing his main role as simply to win election after election. If he continues to rely on people who have repeatedly let him down, and are only interested in their careers and their fortunes, and see him simply as an instrument of winning elections that none of them could do without him, then the victories of 2009 will soon be lost.

Q: Would Indian support to Sri Lanka  serve as a a deterrence against multilateral initiatives by the advanced democracies to push for an investigation into the alleged violation of human rights and humanitarian laws in Sri Lanka?

I hope it will, but we need to work closely with India to make it clear that our own initiatives will suffice to promote human rights in general, as well as both restorative justice and a political dispensation in which all our people can have confidence.  We should fast forward implementation of all the LLRC recommendations, and if we have any reservations, we should explain the reasons for this. We should also set up an advisory group, of countries such as India and Japan and South Africa, and perhaps Australia and Brazil too, to help us move forward, and ensure transparency as well as speed.

Q: What should Sri Lanka do to harness the goodwill of India?

First, we need a coherent foreign policy that is based on traditional SLFP values of Non-Alignment. The last of the groupies of the Jayewardene-Hameed era, who ruined our relations with India, is now Foreign Secretary, which is preposterous, whereas the position should have gone to someone like our present High Commissioner in Delhi, who has the confidence of India. Since his term is up, he should be replaced by someone who has good relations with India and Indians. Most important of all, we need a new Foreign Minister, given that his total mishandling of India in 2012 led to them voting against us.

We should also move on the matters that were agreed during the discussions with the TNA. We had suggested nothing ourselves until I was put on the team, and then the TNA responded positively to two suggestions I made – but since two members of our team were determined to sabotage the talks, nothing further came of these. In fact, when Mr Sumanthiran and i had reached a generally acceptable agreement on land, the President was told that I was giving too much away. This was before the saboteurs had even seen our draft, whereas in fact Mr Sumanthiran was accused of the same by some of his team after they saw the draft.

Thirdly, we must stop centralized control of Indian aid, and instead develop systems that will allow for greater flexibility and local consultation. Reconciliation  should be an essential component of all aid programmes, and there should be greater stress on human resources development and entrepreneurship. Given how the monopoly of the prevalent model of economic development failed to win hearts and minds, there should be a cabinet sub-committe, headed by the Senior HRD Minister, with National Languages, Skills Development, Agriculture and Water Resources and Management, to develop a blueprint for interventions.

We also need more Track Two contacts, with more coherent use of institutions like the Indo-Lanka Foundation, and joint projects between think tanks, of which India has several, whereas we have none of any consequence. We must also restore the type of relationship we had with Chennai, when diplomats like Amza and Nakandawala and Krishnamoorthy were there. The stupidity of the last named being suddenly transferred indicates the complete lack of principle or policy on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as run by its current leaders.
Ceylon Today 6 April 2014

 

 

I am grateful for the request to write about India and the 13th Amendment because, while I have referred to the subject in different contexts, it would be useful to assess precisely what Indian priorities are, and how we should respond to these. In doing this, we should be clear about the principles involved –

  1. As Sri Lankans, our own national interest must come first. This includes both safeguarding the integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka and also ensuring that all our citizens can dwell contentedly in their country, with access to equal opportunities and full participation in politics and development.
  2. As South Asians we must also recognize the important role India plays in the region. This means that, without any violation of our own interests, we must ensure that India does not come under undue pressure from any quarter because of us.

It is clear that we got into a conflict situation with India because we violated the second principle. While India could have reacted less aggressively, I believe the Jayewardene government must be held responsible for allowing India to come under pressure from two quarters. The first was pressure from Tamilnadu, because of what was perceived as, not just discrimination, but also violence against and oppression of Tamils.

Jayewardene presents a baby elephant to American President Ronald Reagan and the American people, 1984

President Jayewardene presents a baby elephant to American President Ronald Reagan and the American people – 1984

The second set of pressures however was more worrying for India, as is clear from the provisions of the Indo-Lankan Accord. The Sri Lankan agreement then to ensure that foreign policy decisions took Indian interests into account (as spelled out with regard to Trincomalee and its oil tanks as well as broadcasting facilities to other nations) made it clear that Jayewardene’s flirtation with America in the Cold War context had worried India deeply.

We must remember that those were days in which America saw India as a hostile element, and had no scruples about engaging in activities calculated to destabilize the country. Salman Rushdie’s brilliant account of language riots in India in the fiftes, in which Tamilnadu hostility was the most aggressive, has a brilliant cameo in which he suggests the American contribution to street violence. And while obviously no direct causal connections can be diagnosed, there is no doubt that America would have been quite happy in those days for India to split up – and the obvious instrument of this would have been Tamil Nadu, with the longstanding American connection to the area, through missionaries in particular.

Read the rest of this entry »

Presentation by Prof Rajiva Wijesinha, MP at the Indo-Sri Lankan Dialogue at the Indian International Centre, New Delhi 21-22 October 2010.

Returnees at Work

But all this is for the future. For the present, what needs to be done to ensure continuing cooperation of the sort that allowed us to overcome terrorism so effectively, while forestalling any backlash within India? In the first place, obviously, we need to continue with activities that will ensure the confidence of the Tamil people within Sri Lanka, but also outside. I refer here by the latter not only to people in Tamil Nadu, but also to the diaspora, some of whom were prepared to threaten the unity of India in addition to that of Sri Lanka, in seeking to deal with grievances real and imaginary.

In what are I think the most important respects, we have done a good job, and will obviously continue on that path. I mean here the programme of rapid resettlement, together with the rehabilitation of former combatants, most of whom we realize were relatively innocent victims of Tiger compulsions. The figures here speak for themselves, and we cannot stress enough how the myths of yesteryear, that we were keeping the displaced in long-term detention, that we were treating former cadres as prisoners, have been so conclusively exploded.

We made it clear that we could not return the displaced immediately, because of the landmines, because of the need for at least basic infrastructure to be in place before people could resume their lives, and because of security considerations. But we made a pledge, soon after the defeat of the Tigers, that the bulk of the returns would take place within six months, and we stuck by this, albeit with slight delays. We must appreciate in this regard the confidence India placed in us, and also the enormous assistance proffered for the purpose, in particular with regard to demining and the provision of shelter. In a sense that approach was an object lesson to those who were less anxious about the displaced than about scoring brownie points with pressure groups through vociferous criticisms of the Sri Lankan state.

Read the rest of this entry »

Rajiva Wijesinha

April 2019
M T W T F S S
« Dec    
1234567
891011121314
15161718192021
22232425262728
2930  
Advertisements
%d bloggers like this: