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Though I resigned from my Ministerial post, I had no intention initially of leaving the government. But even within a month of the new government taking office, there were reasons for grave worry.
No concern at all was evinced with regard to the solemn commitments in the manifestos. The 100 day manifesto, drafted after so much careful discussion, was almost completely ignored. Maithripala Sirisena was indeed sworn in on the 11th, but Ranil Wickremesinghe was sworn in at the same time, not on the next day with the Cabinet as pledged. The Cabinet, slightly larger than pledged and composed predominantly of UNP members, without representation of all parties in Parliament was sworn in on the 13th. The National Advisory Council, renamed the National Executive Council, was again constituted late and did not have representation of all members of Parliament. It soon ceased to function, with the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament which it had entrusted to the Leader of the JVP swiftly forgotten.
Nothing was done about the pledge to amend Standing Orders on January 20th, and it was only because I already had a motion to amend Standing Orders on the table that this was taken up on the 29th. I realized then that the UNP in general was clueless about the whole business, but its membership at large was not obstructive. Lakshman Kiriella, the Chief Whip, let me move my motion, and the Committee on Standing Orders met the following month. We accomplished much, but then Ranil stepped in and imposed a delay until his proposal to set up Consultative Committees was drafted. That this was a ploy became clear when his chosen instrument for this, Priyani Wijeyesekera, told me the draft was ready but he had told her to hold it back. Read the rest of this entry »
One of the biggest problems Sri Lanka faces is the absence of consultation between political parties. The manner in which the Reform Agenda of the President was nearly destroyed because of a failure to see it as a national need is typical of what is wrong. The Prime Minister decided that this was an enterprise for which the UNP had to get the credit, and accordingly he worked only with his chosen acolytes. Though lip service was paid to consultation, through what was termed the National Executive Council, this was set up in a very haphazard fashion, and had no plan of work, nor regular meetings.
So the 19th Amendment emerged, like Athene from the head of Zeus, from the team that Ranil had asked as early as November to prepare a Bill to transfer power from the President to the Prime Minister. Jayampathy Wickremaratne revealed this early in our discussions about the manifesto, and though he took the point that publication of such a Bill during the campaign would play straight into Mahinda Rajapaksa’s hands, he did not accept the further point that such a procedure would be unfair. It was wrong to ask the people to vote for one person in order to give power to another, but Jayampathy was so enamoured by then of the Wickremesinghe agenda, that he simply bided his time and then produced his draft.
The result was that what should have been a process conducted with goodwill on all sides turned acrimonious. Other aspects of the manifesto that seemed equally important to other parties were ignored. Though perhaps Ranil Wickremesinghe was only concerned with what was of immediate importance to him, and thought other things could be dealt with later, the impression he created was that he was simply not interested in strengthening Parliament (through amending the Standing Orders) or introducing a Code of Conduct, or Electoral Reform.
Perhaps he cannot be blamed, given the confrontational view of politics that has developed in the last half century and more. The problem I think started with the manner in which Mrs Bandaranaike’s government was defeated in 1964, which involved bribery on a scale that would now seem ludicrous. But even so, the Parliament elected in 1965 seemed remarkably civilized, and legislation did seem to involve consultation and consensus. Indeed, though I still regret the manner in which the opposition campaigned against Dudley Senanayake’s attempt to introduce District Councils, that measure lost largely because of the internal opposition to devolution in his party.
The 1970 election however put paid to hopes of consensus building. Perhaps traumatized by the 1971 insurrection, the United Front government pushed through its new constitution without sufficient consultation. It did however go through the motions, of setting up a Constituent Assembly, but internal problems in the UNP prevented a principled response, which might have led to more productive discussion. In turn, in 1978, helped by the rout of the SLFP, J R Jayewardene virtually ramrodded his new constitution through, ignoring the very sensible strictures of experts such as N M Perera.
The massive majority he enjoyed, and the carrots he provided his MPs with, led to a breakdown in the Committee system. I was astonished, when I got into Parliament, to find that Committees did not meet regularly, and when they did, they took no notice of what they were supposed to discuss according to the Standing Orders. The business they transacted was about the particular problems of individual MPs. The idea that they should consider policy and examine expenditure seemed incomprehensible to my colleagues. One could not however blame them, since the electoral system J R had instituted meant that they had to devote all their energies to popularizing themselves. Read the rest of this entry »