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The last section I had planned to look at in this series is the Judiciary, though that may be the most important in the current context. The basic suggestions I put forward some weeks back, before the crisis had got so grave, basically addressed problems that were developing precisely because we were confused about two principles that all constitutional dispensations should hold sacred.

The first is that the judiciary should be independent, which means that there should be no interference, by individuals or any other branch of government, with regard to the content of the decisions it makes.

The second is that the judiciary, like all other branches of government, should be accountable to the people. Its decisions should be subject to review, and it should follow procedures so that reliance might be placed not only on its judgments but on the processes through which it reaches such judgments. When procedures are established by law, it must itself obey those laws, though it should have leeway to recommend changes to the legislature when laws prove cumbersome or even unjust. When procedures have not been put in place, it must develop procedures through guidelines that are made known to the public.

For these purposes, so as to

  1. ensure the independence of the judiciary whilst promoting transparency with regard to appointments
  2. promote professionalism in the judiciary
  3. institutionalize justiciability by making all decisions subject to review
  4. introduce alternate mechanisms of seeking justice whilst preserving the ultimate authority of the Courts

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Some years back the Council for Liberal Democracy produced an influential book called ‘Ideas for Constitutional Reform’, edited by Chanaka Amaratunga. A shorter version of this was issued a few years back, and I have now put together a brief outline of further Ideas for Constitutional Reform, based on principles that have emerged in recent consultations with regard to a National Reconciliation Policy, and on the needs expressed in Divisional Secretariat Reconciliation meetings. These are given below, and will be followed by brief articles on the various topics covered.

  1. Electoral Reform

To ensure responsibility of members for a limited area and accountability to a constituency

And

To ensure that Parliament as a whole is proportionate to the wishes of the electorate

The House of Representatives shall consist of two hundred Members elected on a mixed system. One hundred of them will be elected on the basis of constituencies in which the electors shall be similar in number. Such constituencies shall be prescribed by a Delimitation Commission which shall combine the Grama Niladhari Divisions into Constituencies which have commensurate numbers or as near commensurate as possible.

Voters shall vote for individuals in these constituencies. They may give up to three preferences in order, of which only the first shall be counted initially. This is in accordance with the alternative system of voting. After the first count, unless a candidate has received over half the votes cast, the candidate with least first preferences will be eliminated, and such candidate’s preferences redistributed. The process shall be repeated until one candidate shall have received 50% plus one of the total votes cast.

Voters will also cast a second vote for a political party. The remaining hundred members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen so as to reflect the proportion of votes obtained by each party. Each party shall submit a list known as the Party List. After the constituency representatives are declared elected, parties shall receive an allocation that brings up their total representation in Parliament to the proportion they received in the Party vote. .

In the event of a party receiving more seats on the Constituency Vote than the proportion it receives on the Party Vote, it will not receive any seats on the Party Vote, but the surplus shall sit in the House of Representatives which, for that Parliament alone, may have more than 200 members. If independent candidates are elected on the Constituency Vote, without being part of any Independent Group obtaining Party Votes, they too may constitute a surplus for the life of that Parliament.

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Rajiva Wijesinha

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